05 June 2011

The continent, too, wants in on the train wreck

I suspect Keynes isn’t very popular in Germany. For all I know they never heard of him. Angela Merkel appears to be either unimpressed or uninformed as she seeks to find political cover by convincing angry Germans that in return for Germany stumping up a few Euros more, Greece, Ireland and Portugal will sell everything that isn’t nailed down and impose fiscal austerity in ways their respective populations haven’t yet imagined possible. The Germans – and the ECB – will effectively take up residence in these countries’ Ministries of Finance, but this will not go unnoticed in the piazzas outside.

As real austerity begins to kick in, the political situation will become simply untenable.

Yes, fiscal stabilization in Europe is desired at all costs, but the reality of what is entailed to do this – absent adopting other Keynsian solutions in the mix - will without doubt destroy what is left of the EU’s political legitimacy.

I am not an economist and I don’t play one on the tee vee. I freely admit I am supremely unqualified to write or speak intelligently on Europe’s fiscal mess. And yet, perhaps purely by serendipitous coincidence, others have noted Keynes is fatally absent in today’s policy-making circles. Henry Farrell and John Quiggin, the latter the author of the great Zombie Economics, have written in the current edition of Foreign Affairs:
“. . . institutionalizing austerity will badly damage European economies in the short term – and the long-term consequences will be even worse. European politicians worry about the economic consequences if their attempts at fiscal stabilization fail. They should be far more worried about the political consequences.”
After Greece was caught cooking the books and Ireland was caught out as ridiculously profligate, when bondholders ran for the exits, the EU managed to contain the immediate crisis by creating the European Financial Stability Facility. This has the power to issue bonds and raise money to help eurozone states. The Facility stepped in with the International Monetary Fund provide short-term relief.

Beyond the short-term, however, it’s not a pretty picture. Portugal is likely to receive 50-100 billion euros over the next few months. If Spain also requires a bailout, the Facility will fall short. Default is not an option in Europe: the only absolute truth is that so long as a eurozone exists, there will be no Argentinas – at least as long as Germany has anything to say about it. As a result, Germany sees no alternative except making ruthless cuts in government spending. This seems fruitless: bondholders are likely to remain unconvinced in part because they know such cuts will not be politically sustainable.

As the authors point out, the EU is in mortal danger of “compounding its ongoing economic crisis with a political crisis of its own making”.

The only way out is Keynes:
“The short-term solution is clear – even if the European Central Bank, which is still fighting the war against the inflation of the 1980s and 1990s, refuses to recognize it. The solution is a one-off combination of market purchases of bonds and other financial assets, temporarily higher inflation, and fiscal support with the issuance of a common European bond. Quantitative easing, and higher inflation would help ease the pain of adjustment, and a European bond would allow the weaker eurozone states to raise money on international markets. All of this would shore up the euro long enough to allow for further-reaching reforms down the road.”
Everyone would have to make compromises:
“The major euro bondholders would have to bear some of costs – as they should, since they lent excessively during the first years of this century – through either explicit haircuts (in effect a discount of their bonds’ value) or inflation. Germany might not enjoy experiencing temporarily higher inflation, but if this were a one-time cost, it could probably live with the results – as long as it was also reassured that the long-term gain would be stability in the eurozone.”
Sadly, even if I thought policy-makers appreciated the peril of continuing down our current road to ruin, I’ve yet to see a European politician emerge with the courage and leadership qualities necessary to forge the required consensus.

Which makes my disappointment in Obama – who possesses such qualities – all the more painful.

Too bad he wouldn't listen

He heard, but didn't listen:
"If Paul Krugman has a good idea, in terms of how to spend money efficiently and effectively to jump-start the economy, then we’re going to do it. If somebody has an idea for a tax cut that is better than a tax cut we’ve proposed, we will embrace it . . . Just show me. If you can show me that something is going to work, I will welcome it"
That was in January 2009. Had Obama listened to the Nobel laureate - and others who knew a thing or two about fiscal stimulus - the economic recovery and especially the jobs situation would not be his Achilles Heel going into 2012.

I will never understand why - when Obama had all the political capital he required - he refused to accept the obvious.

Meanwhile, reality is finally staring to intrude on the coalition government and its Chancellor as Britain provides textbook instruction on how to repeat the mistakes of the past, with devastating results. The Guardian predictably piles on, but Hutton, as usual, puts it best:
"It is a tragedy – not only for our own unemployed and millions more whose chances of upward mobility and advancement have been wrecked, but for the character of the international debate. The UK – and the world – deserve better."
As the U.S. follows Britain lemming-like into the abyss, three words ought to haunt our leaders: John Maynard Keynes.